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Abstract
In this paper I analyse data from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation to investigate the eﬀect of employer-provided health
insurance (EPHI) on job mobility from March 1996 to February 2000. First,
Ie s t i m a t et h ee ﬀe c to fE P H Io nf o u rm o n t hj o bt u r n o v e r . Iﬁnd that, after
accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity, holding EPHI induces sub-
stantial mobility reductions for all demographic groups, ranging from 31% to
58%. Second, I evaluate whether the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act succeeded in mitigating insurance induced mobility reductions
and I ﬁnd that it did not.
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Health insurance and the labour market are inextricably interlocked in the United
States, where group insurance is available almost exclusively through the workplace.1
As a result, 80% of nonelderly Americans covered by some form of health insurance
were covered by their employer’s health insurance coverage in 1999. Moreover, since
1994, the percentage of nonelderly Americans covered by an employment-based health
insurance plan has been increasing (Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 2000). A
m aj o rd i s a d v a n t a g eo ft h i ss y s t e mi st h a ti tm a yl e a dt oi n e ﬃcient mobility reductions if
workers avoid pursuing higher productivity positions for fear of losing health insurance
coverage, a phenomenon termed “job-lock”.2
The eﬀect of health insurance on job mobility decisions has motivated a signiﬁcant
l i t e r a t u r e . A l t h o u g ht h e r ei ss o m ed i s a g r e e m e n t ,t h e r ei se v i d e n c et h a te m p l o y e r -
provided health insurance (EPHI) reduces yearly job mobility by 25-50%, with mobility
rates from data sources used in this literature that range from 16% to 25%.3
Concerns about job-lock and, more generally, about the implications of the restric-
tion of health insurance availability to the workplace, have played a central role in the
national health insurance reform planning process. In 1985, the federal government,
as part of its Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), required
employers to continue providing health insurance coverage to workers who leave the
ﬁrm for a speciﬁe dp e r i o do ft i m e .T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h i sA c tw a st oa l l e v i a t ej o b - l o c k .
After 1990, there was an expansion of eligibility for COBRA coverage, allowing con-
tinued health coverage through the previous employer even after an individual ﬁnds
employment with a new ﬁrm that oﬀers health insurance as long as he/she continued
to pay the required premiums.
With Bill Clinton’s ascension to the White House, major initiatives regarding
health care reform were expected and the job-lock problem was an important issue
1See Gruber (2000) for an extensive analysis of the features of the health insurance market in the
U.S.
2Job-lock does not only arise for workers considering switches from a ﬁrm providing insurance
to a ﬁrm not providing insurance. There may also be job-lock arising from pre-existing condition
exclusions, probationary periods for new coverage, lack of insurance during unemployed job search
or preferences for a particular plan that might not be oﬀered by another employer.
3See Gruber and Madrian (2002) for a critical review of the literature.
1in the new Administration’s agenda. Universal coverage was the most notable feature
of the unsuccessful Health Security Act (HSA). However, on August 21, 1996, Presi-
dent Clinton signed into law the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA). Although much less ambitious than the HSA, one of the several goals of
the legislation was to reduce job-lock and increase labour market mobility. HIPAA
included several reforms concerning access and portability in the employer group insur-
ance market and also excluded health status as a factor in setting premiums. However,
HIPAA actually did not impose many new requirements in the group market and sev-
eral states already had some form of legislations that met or even surpassed HIPAA
standards.
This paper oﬀers two contributions to the job-lock literature. First, my empiri-
cal approach, which is diﬀerent from methods used in this literature, allows for the
possibility that holding EPHI is correlated with unobserved individual characteristics
(mover-stayer heterogeneity) that may inﬂuence mobility decisions. Second, the use
of the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a lon-
gitudinal data set which interviewed respondents twelve times at four month intervals
since March 1996, allows me to evaluate the impact of HIPAA on job-lock.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature discussing the
existing identiﬁcation strategies and summarises HIPAA’s key reform provisions re-
garding the employer group insurance market. Section 3 provides the basic empirical
framework. The data set used is described in Section 4. In Section 5 the estima-
tion results obtained are presented and discussed. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding
comments.
2 Health Insurance and Job Mobility
2.1 Background Literature
During the past decade, there has been a substantial and growing body of work in-
vestigating the impact of EPHI on job mobility. A major concern in this literature
has been to ﬁnd an identiﬁcation strategy able to overcome the potential correlation
between the holding of EPHI and factors which aﬀect mobility independently from
health insurance. There are two main reasons why this correlation is likely to exist.
2First, jobs that oﬀer health insurance are likely to be “good” jobs. If individuals are
reticent to leave these “good” (high wage and generous beneﬁt package) jobs for rea-
sons other than health insurance, then this would be incorrectly perceived as job-lock.
Second, EPHI may be correlated with individual unobserved characteristics that are
likely to inﬂuence mobility decisions.
T h em o s tp o p u l a ri d e n t i ﬁcation strategy comes from Madrian (1994) and involves a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimator, directly addressing the concern that EPHI is
likely correlated with unobserved positive job attributes that tend to reduce mobility.
The idea of the DD approach is to compare two groups for whom job-lock should
operate diﬀerentially strongly because their insurance valuation is diﬀerent, but for
whom the other characteristics of the “good” jobs should be valued equally. If job-lock
is important, having health insurance coverage from a source other than one’s current
employer should cause a greater variation in mobility for those with EPHI than for
those without EPHI.4 This DD identiﬁcation strategy gives consistent estimates under
the condition that unobservables about jobs and individuals are diﬀerenced away.
Most authors in this literature employ DD estimators to measure job-lock. Madrian
(1994) estimates insurance induced reductions of mobility of approximately 25% for
married men. Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Kapur (1998) ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant
levels of job-lock. Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) obtain job-lock estimates that
range from 20% to approximately 48%, depending on the sub-group analysed, but
these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels for men. Anderson
(1997) ﬁnds that EPHI reduces job mobility for those for whom losing coverage would
be costly and that the lack of EPHI increases mobility for those who would beneﬁtm o s t
by attaining it because of pregnancy or disability (she labels this type of behaviour
“job push”).
More recent papers do explicitly model workers’ decisions and the potential corre-
lation between unobserved individual heterogeneity and EPHI. Dey and Flinn (2003)
develop and estimate an equilibrium model of EPHI and wage determination. They
ﬁnd that jobs providing health insurance are substantially longer than those that do
4Apart from using an indicator for holding non-employer provided health insurance, Madrian
employs two other proxies for insurance valuation which are more direct indicators for potential
medical expenditures: family size and pregnancy of the spouse.
3not provide it. Within their model, heterogeneity in the distribution of ﬁrm costs of
health insurance leads to some ineﬃcient mobility decisions, but the majority of moves
from job to job are associated with productivity improvements.
Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) estimate a joint model of initial tenure, employment
status, marital status, the oﬀer of EPHI, the holding of EPHI, the holding of health
insurance from another source and the employment transition decision. The error
terms in these equations are decomposed into a permanent unobserved component
that may aﬀect diﬀerent outcomes diﬀerently and random noise and the distribution
of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity is approximated by a step function. The
equations of the model are allowed to be linked by dependence on the unobserved
heterogeneity which is treated as a random eﬀect and is integrated out of the model.
They ﬁnd no evidence of job-lock among married men and producing small estimates
of job-lock among unmarried males of between 10% and 15%.
Harrison (2002) estimates a joint model of wages, hazard of job ending and holding
of EPHI. Unobservable characteristics are modeled using person and job random eﬀects
that are correlated across the three equations. She ﬁnds substantial levels of job-lock
of 30-60%.
My empirical strategy to estimate the eﬀect of EPHI on job turnover diﬀers from the
methods used in these studies, since I model the unobserved individual heterogeneity
as a ﬁxed eﬀect and allow it to be correlated with EPHI.
Using statewide variation in continuation of coverage laws, which require employers
to continue providing health insurance coverage to workers who leave the ﬁrm for
a speciﬁc period of time, Gruber and Madrian (1994) ﬁnd that twelve months of
continuation coverage increase turnover by about 10%,5 which suggests that health
insurance does indeed cause reductions in mobility. In the second part of the paper
I evaluate a more recent legislation, the 1996 HIPAA, which also aimed at reducing
job-lock and increasing job mobility.
Finally, another interesting debate in this literature has to do with the temporary or
permanent nature of the job-lock phenomenon. Job-lock could reﬂect risk aversion on
the part of the average employee, arise from fear of being medically underwritten out
of coverage, concerns about long-run coverage or from long-run medical conditions.
5A sizeable eﬀect relative to Madrian’s (1994) estimates of job-lock.
4On the other hand, job-lock might arise from short-run medical conditions such as
pregnancy. In this case, mandatory limited portability policies should be expected to
alleviate job-lock. Gruber and Madrian’s (1994) ﬁnding that continuation of coverage
mandates alleviate a substantial portion of the job-lock problem seems to support
the view that job-lock has a temporary nature. However, Madrian’s (1994) evidence
is mixed, as she ﬁnds evidence of job-lock arising from both pregnancy and larger
families, which gives rise to long-run concerns.
2.2 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996
On August 21, 1996, HIPAA was signed into law. HIPAA’s key reform provisions
regarding the employer group insurance market are summarised below:
1. Increased portability through limitation on pre-existing condition exclusions and
crediting for periods of previous coverage. No ﬁrm can exclude from coverage for more
than 12 months (or 18 months in the case of a late enrollee) any condition (regardless
of its cause) for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was recommended
or received within the 6-month period prior to the enrollment in the insurance plan.
Furthermore, the period of any such preexisting condition exclusion is reduced by the
aggregate of the periods of creditable coverage (if any) applicable to the participant
or beneﬁciary as of the enrollment date. 6
2. Guaranteed issue in the small group market. Health insurance issuers in the
small group market must accept to sell insurance (that is, to oﬀer all actively marketed
products in the small group market) to all small ﬁrms (deﬁned as ﬁrms with 2 to 50
employees) wishing to buy it and must accept all eligible individuals without regard
to health status related factors.
3. Guaranteed renewability in the small and large group market. Once an insurer
sells health insurance coverage in the small or large group market, they must renew
coverage regardless of the health status of any member of a group.
6Most health coverage is creditable coverage. A period of creditable coverage is not counted if,
after such period and before the enrollment date, there has been a 63-day period during all of which
the individual was not covered under any creditable coverage. A waiting period is not considered as
a break in coverage.
54. Individuals cannot be discriminated against on the basis of health status re-
lated factors, both in terms of eligibility (including continued eligibility) and premium
contributions.
After looking at HIPAA’s main reforms regarding the employer group insurance
market, it may seem obvious that the new legislation should indeed have made a
substantial contribution to alleviating job-lock. However, HIPAA actually did not
impose many new requirements in the group market and several states already had
some form of legislations that met or even surpassed HIPAA standards. After the
failure of the HSA, the Administration avoided taking again broad initiatives in this
area, choosing instead to take small steps that could be more easily achieved and
politically attractive although maybe not too economically relevant. According to
the view of Cutler and Gruber (2001), what HIPAA did was to codify the states
regulations, “making them uniform and expanding them in a minor way”. Therefore,
it is ultimately an empirical question to evaluate to what extent and in which states
HIPAA’s regulatory expansions succeeded in reducing job-lock.
3E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
Consider the following model where Q is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
employee quits his/her job and 0 otherwise:
Qit = β0 + β1EPHIit + β2Oit + β3(EPHIit ∗ Oit)+β4Xit + υit (1)
i =1 ,...,N;t =1 ,...,T i
where i denotes individuals, N is the total number of individuals, t denotes time
and Ti is the number of time periods over which individual i is observed. EPHI
is a dummy variable that takes value one if the individual has employer-provided
health insurance and value zero otherwise. O represents health insurance coverage
from a source other than one’s current employer and EPHI ∗ O is the interaction of
this source of coverage and employment-provided health insurance. X denotes other
individual and job characteristics that aﬀect mobility decisions. In this paper, I use
6a wide set of individual and job related variables such as age, sex, race, education,
state of residence, family size, family non wage income, industry, occupation, ﬁrm size,
class of worker, wage, union membership, tenure and pension coverage.7 Ia l s oc o n t r o l
for local labour market conditions by including states unemployment rates over the
estimation period as explanatory variables. This not only accounts for their direct
eﬀect on mobility but also for the likely correlation between business cycle conditions
and the employers’ incentives to provide health insurance and to contribute a larger
or smaller share of its cost.
To explicitly account for the potential presence of individual speciﬁce ﬀects corre-
lated with the regressors I assume that the error term, υit, can be decomposed as
υit = ηi + εit (2)
where ηi denotes an unobservable individual speciﬁce ﬀect, which is assumed time-
invariant, εit ∼ IID(0,σ2
ε) and all the explanatory variables are assumed independent
of the εit for all i and t. ηi represents mover-stayer heterogeneity, which may reﬂect
factors such as individual-speciﬁc turnover propensities and risk aversion. For instance,
risk averse individuals are likely to prefer jobs that provide health insurance coverage,
and, at the same time, to be reluctant to move. Alternatively, one could also argue
that those employees who care a lot about their career and professional development
are likely to have “good” jobs that oﬀer health insurance and to be ready to move more
easily. What these examples show is that the coeﬃcients on EPHI and EPHI∗O are
likely to be biased in the presence of individual speciﬁce ﬀects and that, in principle,
the bias could go in either direction.
In general, the factors mentioned abov ea r el i k e l yt ob ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hEPHI
as well as with other explanatory variables such as education, wages or occupation.
If this is the case, and one mistakenly models ηi as independent of the explanatory
variables, there will be an omitted variable bias and maximum likelihood logit or probit
estimation techniques will fail to provide consistent estimates. As a starting point, I
7Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) point out that pension coverage is likely to be correlated with
EPHI and therefore it should be incorporated into the model. As for tenure, although it may be seen
as a problematic variable because it is the result of a sequential set of quit decisions, it is important
to include it because employees are often required to complete a probationary period before they
become eligible for health beneﬁts.
7use a logit model, and, in addition, I also use Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit
model to control for the ﬁxed eﬀects. Under the assumption that the error term εit
follows a logistic distribution, Chamberlain (1980) shows that consistent estimates can
be obtained by maximising a conditional version of the likelihood function in which the
likelihood of a given mobility sequence is calculated conditional on the total number
of periods in which the individual changed jobs in the sequence. As for the nature of
this conditional likelihood function, it does not involve ηi,t h eﬁxed eﬀects, which are
“diﬀerenced out”.
4D a t a
My data source is the 1996 panel of the SIPP. The adults followed in each SIPP panel
come from a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older
to be selected in households in the civilian noninstitutionalized U.S. population. Those
individuals, along with others who subsequently live with them, are interviewed once
every four months over the life of the panel. In the case of the 1996 panel of the
SIPP, respondents were interviewed twelve times. Each SIPP panel is divided into
four rotation groups. Each rotation group is interviewed in a separate month and four
rotation groups thus constitute a wave.
An important issue that must be addressed when using the SIPP data is “seam
bias”: respondents tend to propagate their status at the point of the interview (the
seam month) backwards through the preceding months. Therefore, I only use infor-
mation corresponding to the fourth month of each reference period (the closest one to
the interview date) so that seam bias is not a concern.
Following previous studies, I use a number of sample selection criteria. First, I
restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 55 who are not enrolled
at school so that the analysis focuses on a group that has high attachment to the
labour force and the results are not confounded by the eﬀect of EPHI on the retirement
decision. Second, the self-employed are excluded. Third, I also exclude agricultural
workers, construction workers and military personnel.8 Finally, I also lose a number of
8Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) point out the idiosyncratic nature of job turnover in the agri-
cultural sector as well as the uniqueness of construction workers in both the seasonal nature of their
8observations because of missing information on some critical control variables such as
wages or health insurance coverage. The ﬁnal sample consists of 213,360 observations
at four month intervals for 35,992 employees, spanning the period from March 1996 to
February 2000. The panel is unbalanced, with employees contributing between once
a n dam a x i m u mo fe l e v e nt i m e s .
Each job is given a unique identiﬁcation number and turnover is deﬁned as chang-
ing employers, becoming self-employed or becoming unemployed during the next four
months. Overall, the four month turnover rate for my sample is 8.22% and the annual
turnover rate is 24.38%. These numbers are in line with mobility rates reported else-
where. Although job-lock really applies only to voluntary turnover, it is not possible to
distinguish voluntary from involuntary job changes because the information contained
in the SIPP is not accurate.9
The core survey contains several questions on health insurance coverage. Respon-
dents are asked whether they had private health insurance during the previous four
months and those answering yes are asked whether it was in their own name, in some-
one else’s name or both. Respondents with insurance in their own name are then asked
whether the source of their insurance was their employer, former employer or union.
The percentages of employees holding EPHI are 72%, 71%, 77% and 51% for sin-
gle men, single women, married men and married women, respectively. This lower
percentage for married women is not surprising, given that 81% of them have an al-
ternative source of coverage (most commonly, the EPHI available to their husbands)
against only 21% of married men.
Descriptive evidence on the job-lock conjecture is reported in Table 1. This table
shows the frequency with which those employees who do and do not receive EPHI leave
their jobs in a period of four months. Not surprisingly, single employees have higher
turnover rates than married employees. To the extent that job-lock is a signiﬁcant
feature of labour market dynamics, turnover rates should be relatively lower among
those who receive EPHI. The predicted pattern is found for both married and single
employees, being these diﬀerences substantial (turnover rates for the uninsured more
work and the tendency for their health insurance to be provided through unions, which explains their
high turnover rates combined with little discontinuity in insurance coverage.
9However, it should be noted that Madrian (1994) ﬁnds that her estimates of job-lock are not
sensitive to whether or not her job change variable includes those who change jobs involuntarily.
9than double those of the uninsured).
This transition table only provides some descriptive evidence on the job-lock hy-
pothesis, since it focuses EPHI and ignores other important factors inﬂuencing turnover
decisions. The core SIPP questionnaire also provides additional information on all the
individual and job related variables outlined in the previous section. Regarding pen-
sion coverage information, unfortunately it is not available on a four month basis but
only on the seventh wave of the panel, when a special topical module on pensions
was administered. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main individual and
job related variables used in the statistical analyses for the entire sample of employees
and for those with and without EPHI. Consistent with the idea that jobs with health
insurance are “good” jobs, insured employees have higher wages and longer tenure.
Moreover, employees holding EPHI are much more likely to work in a big ﬁrm, to be
unionized and to have a higher level of education. Overall, there are substantial dif-
ferences between the two groups in terms of most of the explanatory variables, which
may suggest that there might be diﬀerences in the unobservables as well.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 The Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on
Job Mobility
As a benchmark for later comparisons, equation 1 is ﬁrst estimated by using a logit
model. Logit coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Table 3 for married employees and
in Table 4 for single employees, with columns 1 and 3 corresponding to the male and
female samples, respectively.
First, consider the coeﬃcients on some of the explanatory variables. Consistent
with previous studies, wages and union membership are negatively associated with
turnover for all the demographic groups, although the coeﬃcient on union membership
does not achieve standard levels of signiﬁcance for single women. The eﬀect of an
additional month of tenure is statistically signiﬁcant, positive and decreasing. Having
children under 18 in the household signiﬁcantly reduces the turnover probability only
for women (although the eﬀect for married women is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level).
10Being white is negatively associated with turnover for all groups except for married
men, and, in contrast with the results of Gruber and Madrian (1994), education has
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on mobility. This diﬀerence is likely due
to the inclusion of a richer set of individual and job explanatory variables.
The estimate of the coeﬃcient on EPHI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level for all four demographic groups while the EPHI*Other Insurance
interaction coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the female and male
married employees samples. Therefore, having EPHI reduces the turnover probability
and having other source of insurance causes a greater change in mobility for those
w i t hE P H It h a nf o rt h o s ew i t h o u tE P H I .N o t et h a t ,s i n c eb yf a rt h em o s tp r e v a l e n t
source of non-employment based coverage is the employment-based health insurance
available to one’s spouse, the DD job-lock test based on the EPHI*Other Insurance
interaction term is not feasible for the sample of single employees.10
To assess the magnitude of job-lock I examine the slopes of the turnover proba-
bilities and their percentage variations. The marginal eﬀect for a binary independent
variable is computed as
PS
j=1( ˆ Q1j− ˆ Q0j)
S ,w h e r eS is the total number of observations
and ˆ Q1j and ˆ Q0j denote the predicted probability of moving for observation j when
the dichotomous variable takes values 1 and 0 respectively.11 I evaluate the marginal
eﬀect at every observation and then compute the sample average. Standard errors are
computed by bootstrapping. The turnover probability’s percentage variation due to
t h eE P H Iv a r i a b l ei se q u a lt o[
PS
j=1( ˆ Q1j− ˆ Q0j)]/
PS
j=1 ˆ Q0j
S ∗100. As for the EPHI*Other Ins.
interaction term, it is computed as the DD estimator proposed by Madrian (1994):
hPS















where ˆ Q11j, ˆ Q01j, ˆ Q10j and ˆ Q00j denote the predicted probability of moving for observa-
10Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) account for the joint nature of job change and health insurance
coverage decisions by dual earner couples by setting up a model of jointly endogenous job change
behaviour among dual earner couples. They ﬁnd that accounting for the potential endogeneity of
spousal health insurance has very little impact on their estimated coeﬃcients, concluding that the
failure to account for the correlation bewteeen husband and wife turnover propensity does not signif-
icantly bias estimates of job-lock.
11Both EPHI and the interaction term EPHI*Other Insurance are dummy variables.
11tion j when having both EPHI and other insurance, only EPHI, only other insurance
and no insurance at all, respectively.
The marginal and percentage eﬀects corresponding to the logit estimation are dis-
played in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. For married employees, as expected, the EPHI
variable produces substantially larger percentage job-lock eﬀects (65.81% for men and
56.94% for women) than the DD test, which indicates a 30.80% reduction in mobility
due to EPHI for men versus 20.16% percent for women. For single employees, there
is a 58.31% reduction in mobility due to EPHI for men and a 62.27% for women.
Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Table 3 for married employees
and in Table 4 for single employees, with columns 2 and 4 corresponding to the male
and female samples, respectively. As in the logit estimation, the estimate of the
coeﬃcient on EPHI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all
four demographic groups whereas the EPHI*Other Insurance interaction coeﬃcient
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the male and female married employees
samples. There are, however, substantial diﬀerences in the size of the coeﬃcients.
Compared to the logit coeﬃcient estimates, the absolute value of the EPHI and the
EPHI*Other Insurance interaction coeﬃcients are bigger for both female and male
married employees. On the other hand, the absolute value of the EPHI coeﬃcient is
smaller for single men and bigger for single women. Concerning the coeﬃcients on
the other explanatory variables, most of them widely diﬀer from the logit coeﬃcient
estimates.
The marginal and percentage eﬀects corresponding to the conditional logit esti-
mation are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5. The DD test indicates a 33.50%
reduction in mobility due to EPHI for women versus 45.43% for men. These eﬀects are
substantially larger than the ones estimated using a logit model displayed in columns 1
and 3. For single men, the percentage reduction in mobility due to EPHI correspond-
ing to the conditional logit estimation (58.31%) is almost identical to the one obtained
when using a logit model (58.67%). As for the sample of single women, it appears
that holding EPHI reduces by 31.78% the turnover probability, being this percentage
substantially smaller than the one corresponding to the logit estimation (62.27%).
Given the important diﬀerences that exist between the samples of employees with
and without EPHI in terms of most of the explanatory variables, as shown in Section
124, the fact that diﬀerent results are obtained when using logit and conditional logit
estimation techniques should not come as a surprise, as there might as well be sub-
stantial diﬀerences in the unobservables. To test for the presence of ﬁxed-individual
eﬀects I performed a Hausman-type test based on the diﬀerence between Chamber-
lain’s conditional MLE and the standard logit MLE.12 The value of Hausman’s χ2
statistics reported in columns 1 and 3, at the bottom of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that
the data indeed exhibits heterogeneity in the case of all the demographic groups under
analysis and that the usual logit MLE is inconsistent. Therefore, in what follows I will
primarily rely on the conditional logit estimates.
Regarding the conditional logit estimation technique, note that, since individuals
who have the turnover sequences (0,0,......,0) or (1,1,......,1) are not used in the esti-
mation, sample sizes are now smaller. One may be concerned that the results obtained
with the conditional logit estimation are based on a very special sample of employees
(those who change jobs at least once during the estimation period but not in each of
the periods) that does not necessarily represent the population of employees. Compar-
ison of descriptive statistics for the samples used in the conditional logit estimations
and the full samples show that there are no major diﬀerences. In results not reported,
I also estimate a logit model on the samples used for the conditional logit estimations
to see if the estimates obtained are closer to the conditional logit estimates than the
logit estimates based on the full samples. Results from these analyses indicate that
they are not. Therefore, the diﬀerences between the logit and the conditional logit
estimates do not seem to be due to the fact that the latter are based on a special
sample of employees.
A sm e n t i o n e di nS e c t i o n4 ,p e n s i o nc o v e r a g ei n f o r m a t i o ni sn o ta v a i l a b l eo naf o u r
month basis but only on the seventh wave of the panel. Hence, all that can be done
is to estimate a job turnover equation including pension coverage as an independent
variable by focusing on the information provided on the seventh wave of the 1996
SIPP panel and using a logit model. The results of this estimation, not reported in
the paper, show that the estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest are fairly similar to the
12The latter estimator is consistent and eﬃcient only under the null hypothesis of homogeneity (ηi =
η) and inconsistent under the alternative, whereas Chamberlain’s estimator is consistent whether the
null hypothesis is true or not.
13logit estimates previously presented. Hence, the results appear robust to the inclusion
of pension coverage as a control.
All the models presented so far have been estimated considering yearly instead of
four month turnover equations. The results obtained (not shown) are qualitatively
very similar, although the magnitude of the eﬀects is, not surprisingly, generally some-
what smaller. The short run versus long run nature of the job-lock problem is now
investigated. The time span of the 1996 SIPP panel is not long enough to estimate
a three or even a two-year turnover equation by using a conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logit
model. However, it is useful to do so by using a logit model, despite its limitations, to
provide some evidence on this issue. Table 6 summarises the results of estimating a
three-year turnover equation by using a logit model. The job-lock percentage eﬀects
are substantially smaller than those obtained when estimating four month turnover
equations. However, these eﬀects still range between 21% and 27% for all demographic
groups and all the corresponding coeﬃcients achieve standard levels of signiﬁcance.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that controlling for individual heterogene-
ity would have increased the magnitude of the estimated job-lock eﬀects, as it did in
the previous analyses. Hence, these results support the view that the nature of the
job-lock problem is not temporary.
5.2 Did HIPAA Reduce Job-Lock?
I now evaluate the extent to which HIPAA succeeded in mitigating insurance induced
mobility reductions. Since the data set used spans the period from March 1996 to
February 2000 and HIPAA was signed into law on August 21, 1996, one could sim-
ply compare the magnitude of job-lock before and after HIPAA’s provisions became
eﬀective. However, simple comparisons of pre-HIPAA and post-HIPAA job-lock mag-
nitudes are likely to be contaminated by temporal trends in job-lock or by the eﬀect
of events, other than the legislation, that occurred between both periods. Ideally, the
counterfactual exercise one would like to do would be to compare the changes that
a r eo b s e r v e di ns t a t e si nw h i c hH I P A A ’ sp r o visions led to new group reforms to what
would have happened over time in these same states had these reforms not taken place.
It is not possible to observe the latter, but since there is a group of states that had
already met all the HIPAA requirements in the pre-HIPAA period, this comparison
14group can be used to identify temporal variation in job-lock that is not due to HIPAA.
The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DDD) estimator is based on this idea.
Table 7 identiﬁes groups of states according to whether they lacked none, one
or more of HIPAA’s requirements described in Section 3. This table is based on
the database collected by the Institute for Health Policy Solutions which has been
described and analysed by Long et. al. (1998) and Curtis et. al. (1999). This
database reviewed detailed information on the small-group health insurance reform
statutes and regulations adopted by each state prior to HIPAA, therefore providing
a comprehensive picture of each state’s regulatory environment prior to the federal
legislation. A complete list of the states belonging to each of the groups is given in
the Appendix.
Alabama (which is the only state in Group A) is the only state that lacked all
of the HIPAA requirements in the pre-HIPAA period. Both Group B and Group C
include states that allowed to use health as a rating factor and lacked guaranteed
issue, although in the case of Group C, states lacked guaranteed issue but only of a
number of insurance products. Group D includes states that met all the HIPAA access
provisions but they did not exclude health status as a factor in setting premiums.
Finally, Group E is my comparison group of states given that it includes states that
had adopted regulations that met all the HIPAA minimum requirements prior to the
federal legislation, as they all had some restrictions on the use of health as a rating
factor and access reforms typically came before rating reforms.
To evaluate whether HIPAA succeeded in reducing job-lock, I use a DDD identiﬁ-
cation strategy. This strategy consists in exploiting the variation across states in the
non redundancy of HIPAA’s requirements to compare the change in job-lock in the
pre-HIPAA and the post-HIPAA periods in states which had to adopt legislation to
conform to HIPAA requirements (Groups A, B, C and D) with the change in states
that did not need to do so (Group E).
I estimate an extended version of equation 1:
Q
∗
it = β0 + β1EPHIit + β2GroupADit + β3PostHIPAA it + (3)
β4(EPHIit ∗ GroupADit ∗ PostHIPAA it)+β5Xit + υit
where three new binary variables have been included. GroupA-D takes value one if the
employee works in a state belonging to Group A, B, C or D and value 0 if he/she works
15in a state belonging to Group E, the control group. Post-HIPAA takes values 1 during
the period after HIPAA became eﬀective and value 0 before that period. Finally,
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA is an interaction term between EPHI, GroupA-D and
Post-HIPAA. HIPAA protections generally became eﬀective with new plan years (i.e.,
the renewal date of the plan) beginning on or after July 1, 1997. Hence, in order to
use in the estimation a post-HIPAA period in which the legislation had surely had
time to play out its eﬀects, I do not use 1997 observations.
The DDD test is based on β4 and it requires that in absence of the legislation,
the average job-lock magnitude for all states would have followed parallel paths over
time. This assumption might be implausible if characteristics that are thought to be
associated with the dynamics of job-lock are unbalanced between the states belonging
to groups A, B, C and D and the states belonging to group E. Therefore, it is necessary
to control for a wide set of covariates, X , as done in the previous analyses.
Table 8 displays the logit estimation results. Coeﬃcients on the EPHI*GroupA-
D*Post-HIPAA interaction variable are statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels
for all demographic groups. Hence, according to these estimates, HIPAA did not
contribute to reduce job-lock. I also estimate equation 3 by using a conditional logit
model. Table 9 displays the conditional logit estimation results. The coeﬃcients on
the EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA interaction variable are not statistically signiﬁcant
for married women and single men and the corresponding percentage eﬀects are very
small in magnitude. However, surprisingly, coeﬃcients on the EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-
HIPAA interaction term are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for
married men and single women. Moreover, the percentage eﬀects are substantial,
suggesting that HIPAA provoked a 23% and a 27% reduction in job-lock for married
men and single women, respectively. However, note that only individuals who moved
from a state belonging to groups A, B, C or D to a state belonging to group E or
viceversa during the estimation period are contributing to these eﬀects. This is a very
small sample, as it only contains 298, 204, 144 and 201 observations for married men,
married women, single men and single women, respectively. Moreover, this sample is
far from being representative of the population of employees. For instance, married
men and single women in this sample are particularly young and very highly educated.
In results not reported I estimate a logit model on these sub-samples and the estimates
16obtained are very close to the conditional logit estimates.13 Hence, the unexpected
results obtained for married men and single women when using a conditional logit
m o d e ls e e mt ob ed u et ot h es i z ea n dt h es p e c i a lc h a r a c t e r i s t i c so ft h es a m p l eo f
individuals for whom the eﬀect of interest is estimated rather than to the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the regressors in the case of these two
demographic groups. In summary, taken together, the evidence presented suggests
that HIPAA did not succeed in reducing job-lock.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyses data from the 1996 panel of the SIPP to investigate the eﬀect
of EPHI on job mobility from March 1996 to February 2000. First, I estimate the
eﬀect of EPHI on job turnover by allowing for the possibility that the holding of EPHI
is correlated with unobserved individual heterogeneity that may inﬂuence mobility
decisions and modeling the heterogeneity as a ﬁxed eﬀect. I ﬁnd that holding EPHI
induces substantial mobility reductions for all demographic groups, ranging from 31%
to 58%. Moreover, I present some evidence supporting the view that the nature of the
job-lock problem is not temporary, since the job-lock eﬀects obtained when estimating
three year turnover equations still range between 21% and 27%.
Second, I evaluate whether HIPAA succeeded in alleviating job-lock and I ﬁnd
that it did not. This ﬁnding is consistent with Kapur’s (2003) conclusion that, as
a package, small group health insurance reforms are unlikely to have a large eﬀect
on job mobility. There are several potential reasons why HIPAA had no impact on
job-lock. As for guaranteed access, it implies access to insurance for all small groups
but it does not guarantee aﬀordability. Whether guaranteed access leads to additional
group insurance purchases is likely to depend on whether and what type of rating
restrictions the state insurance legislation places on premiums that insurers can charge
small groups. Regarding guaranteed renewal, it is not an eﬀective guarantee of access
to coverage without limits on premium increases, since HIPAA did not provide for
aﬀordable coverage, it only ensured the continued right to purchase a plan. Finally,
there are other concerns about EPHI that HIPAA left unaddressed. For example, to
13Moreover, the Hausman test indicates that the logit MLE is consistent.
17the extent a worker is concerned about losing access to a favorite physician, moving
to a new health plan may not be optimal. Also, HIPAA did not require that expenses
applied towards one plan’s deductible or out of pocket maximum must be applied
towards the new plan’s provisions. As a result, changing jobs may still result in larger
out of pocket payments. Additionally, after an uncovered period of more than 63 days,
any previously attained eligibility is forfeited.
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19APPENDIX
PRE-HIPAA STATE GROUPS
• GROUP A: Alabama.
• GROUP B: Illinois, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, West
Virginia.
• GROUP C: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin.
• GROUP D: California, Minnesota, Texas.
• GROUP E: Arkansas, Connecticut, DC, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, Maine, Vermont.
TABLES









Note: Statistics based on the observations for which complete information is available on all
the variables used in the statistical analyses.
20Table 2: Sample Means of Key Variables
Employer-Provided Health Insurance All
Yes No
(1) (2) (3)
Leave Job 0.05 0.14 0.08
(0.22) (0.35) (0.27)
EPHI - - 0.67
(0.47)
Other Insurance 0.09 0.54 0.23
(0.28) (0.49) (0.42)
EPHI*Other Ins. - - 0.06
(0.23)
ln(Hourly Wage) 2.60 2.19 2.46
(0.55) (0.57) (0.59)
Months Tenure 112.62 60.60 95.48
(96.70) (71.50) (92.48)
Small Firm 0.09 0.31 0.17
(0.29) (0.46) (0.37)
Medium Firm 0.11 0.14 0.12
(0.31) (0.35) (0.33)
Big Firm 0.78 0.53 0.70
(0.40) (0.49) (0.45)
Union Member 0.22 0.06 0.17
(0.41) (0.25) (0.37)
Age 39.90 38.95 39.59
(8.35) (8.33) (8.35)
Male 0.54 0.35 0.48
(0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
Married 0.63 0.71 0.66
(0.48) (0.45) (0.47)
Non-White 0.15 0.17 0.15
(0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
ln(Family non Wage Income) 2.91 2.88 2.90
(2.60) (2.77) (2.66)
Nr. Children<18 0.84 1.05 0.91
(1.09) (1.18) (1.12)
No High School Degree 0.06 0.14 0.09
(0.24) (0.35) (0.28)
High School Degree 0.29 0.34 0.30
(0.45) (0.47) (0.46)
Some College 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
College Degree 0.21 0.14 0.19
(0.40) (0.35) (0.39)
Graduate Degree 0.11 0.05 0.09
(0.31) (0.23) (0.29)
N. Obs. 143,061 70,299 213,360
21Table 3: Job Turnover Logit and Conditional Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. Married
Employees
Married Men Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
EPHI -1.172** -1.298** -0.911** -1.125**
(0.047) (0.069) (0.052) (0.082)
Other Insurance -0.466** -0.521** -0.360** -0.392**
(0.048) (0.095) (0.043) (0.085)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.274** 0.451** 0.188* 0.257*
(0.091) (0.128) (0.078) (0.116)
ln(Hourly Wage) -0.306** -0.501** -0.287** -0.478**
(0.033) (0.051) (0.035) (0.057)
Months Tenure -0.007** 0.015** 0.008** 0.019**
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Months Tenure2/100 0.001** -0.003** 0.001** -0.005**
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Small ﬁrm 0.073˜ 0.291** 0.027 0.032
(0.043) (0.071) (0.037) (0.065)
Medium ﬁrm 0.099* 0.218** 0.069 -0.024
(0.045) (0.067) (0.044) (0.067)
Union member -0.201** -0.163˜ -0.238** -0.246*
(0.051) (0.093) (0.060) (0.101)
Age -0.006 -0.038 -0.062** -0.290**
(0.019) (0.095) (0.018) (0.094)
Age2/100 -0.007 0.056 0.062** 0.344**
(0.024) (0.111) (0.023) (0.109)
Non-White -0.002 - 0.139** -
(0.046) (0.043)
ln(Family non Wage income) 0.026** 0.010 0.022** 0.031**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Nr. Children<18 -0.021 -0.175** -0.028˜ 0.006
(0.013) (0.053) (0.014) (0.058)
High School Degree 0.236** - 0.027 -
(0.052) (0.054)
Some College 0.202** - 0.157** -
(0.055) (0.056)
College Degree 0.280** - 0.091 -
(0.064) (0.065)
Graduate Degree 0.310** - 0.207* -
(0.076) (0.082)
N. Obs. 72,644 22,660 68,570 23,333
Log-Likelihood -16722.5 -6726.6 -17681.2 -7134.3
χ2 Hausman Test 781.41** 896.69**
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next
four months and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are ndustry, occupation, class
of worker, state, year and quarter dummies and states unemployment rates. The year and
quarter dummies are actually dummies for the year and the quarter in which the four month
period begins respectively. Standard errors in parentheses with p<0.1=˜,p <0.05=*a n d
p<0.01=**. “-” denotes variables not included in the conditional logit estimations because
they are time-invariant.
22Table 4: Job Turnover Logit and Conditional Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. Single
Employees
Single Men Single Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
EPHI -0.999** -0.894** -1.092** -1.151**
(0.049) (0.072) (0.045) (0.067)
ln(Hourly Wage) -0.231** -0.293** -0.243** -0.325**
(0.045) (0.073) (0.046) (0.068)
Months Tenure -0.008** 0.017** -0.008** 0.018**
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001)
Months Tenure2/100 0.002** -0.004** 0.001** -0.005**
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Small ﬁrm -0.060 0.016 -0.029 0.049
(0.052) (0.090) (0.046) (0.077)
Medium ﬁrm -0.018 -0.020 0.0001 -0.118
(0.056) (0.091) (0.053) (0.078)
Union member -0.212** -0.129 -0.093 -0.252*
(0.071) (0.126) (0.070) (0.123)
Age -0.024 -0.151 -0.018 0.036
(0.023) (0.120) (0.020) (0.100)
Age2/100 0.006 0.196 -0.0001 -0.008
(0.031) (0.147) (0.026) (0.121)
Non-White 0.105* - 0.019 -
(0.052) (0.043)
ln(Faily non Wage income) 0.003 0.040* -0.0008 0.0003
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012)
Nr. Children<18 0.033 0.097 -0.051** -0.034
(0.036) (0.118) (0.019) (0.069)
High School Degree 0.241** - 0.085 -
(0.068) (0.057)
Some College 0.326** - 0.238** -
(0.071) (0.073)
College Degree 0.227** - 0.190* -
(0.084) (0.095)
Graduate Degree 0.401** - 0.185* -
(0.108) (0.120)
N. Obs. 30,843 10,834 41,303 14,715
Log-Likelihood -9324.3 -3424.0 -11911.8 -4640.1
χ2 Hausman Test 352.57** 417.06**
Note: See note to Table 3.
23Table 5: Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on Job Turnover
Married Men Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.087 -0.144 -0.061 -0.001
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.00001)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.018 0.050 0.014 0.0004
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00001)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 65.81 66.83 56.94 67.50
EPHI*Other Ins. 30.80 45.43 20.16 33.50
Single Men Single Women
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.097 -0.019 -0.099 -0.232
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 58.67 58.31 62.27 31.78
Note: Marginal and percentage eﬀects have been computed using the coeﬃcient estimates
reported in Tables 3 and 4. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
24Table 6: Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on 3-Year Job Turnover. Logit
Estimates
Married Employees Single Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
Coeﬃcients
EPHI -0.756** -0.582** -0.702** -0.724**
(0.105) (0.115) (0.120) (0.145)
Other Insurance -0.326** -0.349** - -
(0.123) (0.111)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.424* 0.497** - -
(0.168) (0.149)
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.171 -0.128 -0.155 -0.158
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.093 0.105 - -
(0.0001) (0.0002)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 31.89 24.50 25.27 27.05
EPHI*Other Ins. 21.81 24.02 - -
N. Obs. 6,273 5,992 2,410 3,357
Log-Likelihood -3920.7 -3724.0 -1507.0 -2047.3
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next
three years and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are ln(hourly wage), months tenure,
months tenure2/100, union membership, age, age2/100, non-white dummy, ln(family non
wage income), nr. children<18, ﬁrm size, education, industry, occupation, class of worker,
state and month dummies and states unemployment rates. The month dummies are ac-
tually dummies for the month in which the four month period begins. Standard errors in
parentheses with p<0.1=˜,p <0.05=*a n dp <0.01=**.
T a b l e7 :S t a t e sR e g u l a t i o n sP r i o rt oH I P A A
Regulations State Groups
prior to HIPAA Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
Limits on
Pre-ex.conditions No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group to Group
Portability No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guaranteed
Renewal No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guaranteed
Issue No No Some Products Yes Yes
Health Allowed
as Rating Factor? Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Note: Information based on the database collected by the Institute for Health Policy Solu-
tions.
25Table 8: Job Turnover Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. HIPAA and the Eﬀect of Employer-
Provided Health Insurance on Job Mobility
Married Employees Single Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
Coeﬃcients
EPHI -1.189** -0.774** -1.003** -1.098**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.066) (0.0611)
Group A-D -0.021 -0.065˜ -0.030 -0.025
(0.044) (0.038) (0.054) (0.048)
Post-HIPAA -0.201** -0.205** -0.263** -0.326**
(0.047) (0.042) (0.058) (0.051)
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 0.095 -0.076 -0.016 0.081
(0.064) (0.070) (0.083) (0.076)
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.089 -0.052 -0.099 -0.100
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.006
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
% Variation in Mobility due to:
EPHI 66.35 59.83 58.76 62.50
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 4.81 -6.65 -1.03 4.83
N. Obs. 52,689 49,806 22,404 29,900
Log-Likelihood -12163.9 -12910.3 -6831.0 -8589.4
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next four
months and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are ln(hourly wage), months tenure,
months tenure2/100, union membership, age, age2/100, non-white dummy, ln(family non
wage income), nr. children<18, ﬁrm size, education, industry, occupation, class of worker
and quarter dummies and states unemployment rates. The quarter dummies are actually
dummies for quarter in which the four month period begins. Standard errors in parentheses
with p<0.1=˜,p <0.05=*a n dp <0.01=**.
26Table 9: Job Turnover Conditional Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. HIPAA and the Eﬀect
of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on Job Mobility
Married Employees Single Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
M e nW o m e n M e nW o m e n
Coeﬃcients
EPHI -1.348** -0.923** -1.017** -1.224**
(0.087) (0.090) (0.110) (0.099)
Group A-D -0.133 0.261 -0.122 -0.173
(0.311) (0.360) (0.432) (0.354)
Post-HIPAA -0.442** -0.194˜ -0.685** -0.475**
(0.106) (0.102) (0.148) (0.119)
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 0.222* -0.071 -0.021 0.242*
(0.094) (0.103) (0.103) (0.135)
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.228 -0.012 -0.028 -0.264
(0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 0.037 -0.001 -0.0005 0.050
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001)
% Variation in Mobility due to:
EPHI 30.48 59.76 62.64 46.40
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA 27.14 -4.65 -1.08 23.31
N. Obs. 13,231 13,662 6,335 8,505
Log-Likelihood -4097.7 -4393.0 -2023.2 -2752.0
Note: See note to Table 8.
27